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FOREWORD
In our military professions, formal analytical methods co-exist
with intuitive decisionmaking by leaders in action. For the most part,
there is no harm done. But many ofﬁcers can recount times when
they knew they should have “gone with their gut,” but followed
instead the results of their analytical methods. The gap between
these two forms of decisionmaking perhaps has grown wider in
recent times, especially in Iraq, where adaptive leadership seems to
have overshadowed formal methods of planning. Departing from
formal methods increasingly seems to be the mark of an effective
commander, as we learn from Dr. Leonard Wong’s recent Strategic
Studies Institute (SSI) report, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible
Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom (July 2004).
But must it be so? Dr. William Duggan shows how to reconcile
analytical and intuitive methods of decisionmaking by drawing
on recent scientiﬁc research that brings the two together. He
applies this new research to the Army’s core methods of analytical
decisionmaking as found in Field Manual (FM) 5-0, Army Planning
and Orders Production. The result is “strategic intuition,” which bears
remarkable resemblance to von Clausewitz’s idea of coup d’oeil in
his classic work, On War. Dr. Duggan’s monograph provides a
theoretical overview of strategic intuition and practical suggestions
for amending FM 5-0 to take it into account.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph
as a contribution to the ongoing effort to make our military forces
ever more adaptable in both theory and practice.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This monongraph reviews the U.S. Army’s standard methods for
problem solving and decisionmaking to see how they might take
more account of a commander’s intuition at every step. The ideas
offered here go beyond the Army’s current view of intuition in its
latest version of Field Manual (FM) 5-0, Army Planning and Orders
Production, issued January 2005. That version presents “analytical”
and “intuitive” as two different types of decisionmaking, for two
different situations:
•

The analytical approach to decisionmaking serves well when
time is available to analyze all facets affecting the problem
and its solution. However, analytical decisionmaking
consumes time and does not work well in all situations—
especially during execution, when circumstances often
require immediate decisions.

•

Intuitive decisionmaking is especially appropriate in
time-constrained conditions. It signiﬁcantly speeds up
decisionmaking. Intuitive decisionmaking, however, does not
work well when the situation includes inexperienced leaders,
complex or unfamiliar situations, or competing courses of
action (COAs).

This divide between analysis and intuition reﬂects an outmoded
view of the human mind that science no longer supports. Recent
advances in how the mind works have overturned the old idea that
analysis and intuition are two separate functions that take place in
two different parts of the brain. In the new view, analysis and intuition
are so intertwined that it is impossible to sort them out. There is
no good analysis without intuition, and no good intuition without
analysis. They go together in all situations. Some scientists call the
new model of the brain “intelligent memory,” where analysis puts
elements into your brain and intuition pulls them out and combines
them into action.
This new model of the brain ﬁnds two striking precedents:
research in cognitive psychology on expert intuition, especially by
v

Gary Klein; and On War by Carl von Clausewitz. Both Klein and
von Clausewitz put ﬂashes of insight at the heart of problem solving
and decisionmaking. Their views on how those ﬂashes happen
match quite well what neuroscience now tells us about how the
brain works. To describe this phenomenon, Von Clausewitz used
the term coup d’oeil, or “glance” in French. Here we use coup d’oeil as
a shorthand, thanks to its military origins, and “strategic intuition”
as a more formal term, where a COA forms in the mind through a
mix of strategic analysis, intelligent memory, and expert intuition.
This monograph reviews the Army’s core procedures on
problemsolving and decisionmaking from our new view of strategic
intuition. We go step-by-step through the four main chapters of FM
5-0, which embody the Army’s common methods for how
commanders of every rank decide what COA to take. We see in detail
where these methods do and do not match our new understanding
of strategic intuition. Then we consider the case of a brigade in Iraq
that recently developed a shorter version of FM 5-0, to compare this
real-time experiment to what we suggest in this report.
This in no way criticizes the Army or its commanders. When
Gary Klein tests methods closer to strategic intuition with Army
ofﬁcers in action, they tend to comment, “That’s what we do.”
Good commanders use strategic intuition. They treat manuals only
as guides, and adapt procedures as they see ﬁt. Coup d’oeil is really
a description of what Army leaders already do. We have gained
enough scientiﬁc knowledge on how a commander’s mind works
to revise our manuals accordingly, so there are fewer adaptations
needed. Everyone takes FM 5-0 with a grain of salt: now that we
know how the salt works, we can add it directly to the recipe.
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COUP D’OEIL:
STRATEGIC INTUITION IN ARMY PLANNING
Introduction.
In recent years, science has made great strides in understanding
how thinking really happens. A generation ago, scientists believed in
two main modes of thought where analysis and intuition were two
different functions, on two different sides of the brain. But scientists
no longer believe that. Instead, they recognize a single mode of
thought that combines analysis and intuition. Scientists now see the
brain take in elements, store them in short- or long-term memory, and
then select and combine them in ﬂashes of insight. Some scientists call
this new model “intelligent memory,” where analysis and intuition
are impossible to sort out.1 Neuroscientist Barry Gordon tells us:
Intelligent Memory . . . is like connecting dots to form a picture. The
dots are pieces or ideas, the lines between them are your connections
or associations. The lines can coalesce into larger fragments, and these
fragments can merge to form a whole thought. This whole thought may
be a visual image, a piece of knowledge, an idea, or even a solution to a
problem. Individual pieces, the connections, and the mental processing
that orchestrates them generally work together so they appear to be a
single cognitive event. That’s what happens when ideas or concepts
“pop” into your mind.2

Perhaps the best way to understand this new model of the brain
is to think of a giant warehouse. Your brain is the greatest inventory
system on earth. It constantly takes in information, breaks it down,
and puts in on its warehouse shelves—that’s analysis. Your brain
then compares the new information with other items on other shelves.
When it ﬁnds a match, it pulls those items off the shelves and puts
them together in a ﬂash of intuition. The combination of analysis
and intuition becomes “creative insight,” which is “the ability to
take existing pieces of information and combine them in novel ways
that lead to greater understanding and suggest new behaviors and
responses.”3
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This view, in turn, conﬁrms previous research on expert intuition,
especially by Gary Klein.4 An expert’s brain stores up cases from
direct experience and the experience of others acquired through
learning. Answers then come to the expert in ﬂashes of insight, large
and small. Klein followed experts in action—ﬁreﬁghters, emergency
room nurses, soldiers in battle—and interviewed them on the details
of their decisions. At ﬁrst they said, “It was just my intuition.” But
every time, Klein was able to pull from them the elements they
combined from what they saw and what was already in their brains.
He especially noted that experts often change the goal or the problem
to be solved after they see what to do. That overturns conventional
methods of linear problem solving, where you deﬁne the goal or
problem ﬁrst. Klein tells us:
What triggers active problem solving is the ability to recognize when
a goal is reachable . . . There must be an experiential ability to judge
the solvability of problems prior to working on them . . . Experience lets
us recognize the existence of opportunities. When the opportunity is
recognized, the problem solver working out its implications is looking
for a way to make good use of it, trying to shape it into a reasonable
goal.5

This modern research on intelligent memory and expert intuition
ﬁnds a surprising precedent in the writings of Carl Clausewitz in the
early 19th century. His great work, On War, was the ﬁrst scholarly
study of strategy. Clausewitz set out to explain the success of
Napoleon Bonaparte, who won more battles than any other general in
recorded history. With our new knowledge of how the mind works,
we can pick out one key term that Clausewitz used for the ﬂash of
insight when a strategist sees what to do, despite the uncertainties all
around. He called it coup d’oeil, which means “glance” in French. Coup
d’oeil cuts through the fog of war. Clausewitz explains, “Now, if one
is to get safely through this perpetual conﬂict with the unexpected,
two qualities are indispensable . . . The ﬁrst is ﬁguratively expressed
by the French phrase coup d’oeil. The other is resolution.”6
For Clausewitz, coup d’oeil is “the rapid discovery of a truth which
to the ordinary mind is either not visible at all or only becomes so
after long examination and reﬂection.”7 After you see what to do, you
need resolve to carry through despite the remaining uncertainties.
2

For Clausewitz resolution means “removing the torments of doubt
. . . when there are no sufﬁcient motives for guidance.”8 To these
two qualities, Clausewitz adds a third: “From the coup d’oeil and
resolution, we are naturally led to speak of its kindred quality,
presence of mind, which in a region of the unexpected like War must
act a great part, for it is indeed nothing but a great conquest over the
unexpected.”9
To these three—coup d’oeil, resolution, and presence of mind—
Clausewitz adds a fourth element: the content of the coup d’oeil itself.
In theory, an inﬁnite number of possible goals and courses of action
(COAs) exist in any situation. Clausewitz asks, “How does strategy
arrive at a complete list of these things?” He answers: “Strategy
deduces only from experience the ends and means to be examined
. . . It therefore turns to experience, and directs its attention on
those combinations which military history can furnish.”10 Note that
“experience” here means not only the commander’s experience, but
all of human history. Napoleon himself told us he borrowed his
strategy from the campaigns of the “great captains” he studied.11
Elsewhere, Clausewitz calls this historical experience “examples
from history” which “make everything clear, and furnish the best
description of proof in the empirical sciences.”12
Clausewitz’s discussion of coup d’oeil and its three accompanying
elements—resolution, presence of mind, and examples from
history—shows remarkable similarity to what modern research tells
us about strategic intuition.13 Yet U.S. Army planning methods have
followed more Clausewitz’s leading competitor, Antoine Jomini,
whose Summary of the Art of War won over many military academies
of the 19th century, including West Point. For logistics, which Jomini
founded as a discipline, there is no harm done. But for strategy at
all levels—that is, ﬁguring out your COA and the end state it leads
to—modern science favors Clausewitz.14
The resolution that follows coup d’oeil is especially important
in modern professions. You might have a coup d’oeil but then fail
to carry it through, because you cannot explain it using the formal
tools of your trade. Many key insights are lost this way. We have
so many advanced methods of analysis and decisionmaking today,
that we sometimes forget they are aids to problem solving, not
the problem solvers themselves. Human beings are the problem
3

solvers. Our brains solve problems through insight. The science of
intelligent memory and expert intuition—as well as our old friend,
Clausewitz—can help us put insight back at the center of what we
do.
This monograph aims to help the Army put a commander’s insight
more ﬁrmly at the center of its core methods for problem solving
and decisionmaking. We adopt “coup d’oeil” as a shorthand, and
“strategic intuition” as a more formal term, to convey what studies
of intelligent memory and expert intuition now conﬁrm about what
Clausewitz told us. We deﬁne strategic intuition as follows:
Strategic intuition. The selective projection of past elements into the
future in a new combination as a course of action that might or might not
ﬁt your previous goals, with the personal commitment to follow through
and work out the details along the way.

The next sections of this monograph work through the implications
of this deﬁnition for the Army’s methods of command, using Field
Manual (FM) 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, as our core
manual. In the Preface to FM 5-0, we learn that it is “the common
reference for planning within the Army education system.” It applies
to “all Army leaders . . . at all echelons,” and “across the spectrum
of conﬂict . . . and the range of operations.” So every Army leader
should use the methods of FM 5-0 for every problem or decision.
This certainly makes our effort worthwhile: if strategic intuition can
improve the methods in FM 5-0, it will beneﬁt the Army’s whole
leadership corps.
Of course, Army leaders at present do not follow FM 5-0 exactly.
They already apply strategic intuition and adapt the methods of
FM 5-0 to their own styles. If coup d’oeil is merely relabeling what
Army leaders already do, this study might help the Army adapt FM
5-0 accordingly. That would save time in training and in the ﬁeld,
through common methods that conform more closely to how a
commander’s mind really works.
Fundamentals of Planning.
Chapter 1 of FM 5-0, “Fundamentals of Planning,” begins with
a quote from General George Patton: “Successful generals make
4

plans to ﬁt circumstances, but do not try to create circumstances to
ﬁt plans.”
Let’s pause right here. We know that Patton was famous for
his “sixth sense”—ﬂashes of insight that showed him his strategy.
His commander, Omar Bradley, complained that Patton was a bad
planner. Patton only worked out all the details after his coup d’oeil
clicked in. Before that, he left everyday planning to his staff. Patton
made no secret of the source of his insights: “For years I have been
accused of indulging in snap judgments. Honestly this is not the case
because . . . I am a profound military student and the thoughts I
express . . . are the result of years of thought and study.”15
Patton’s study of past battles was so intense that he seemed to
believe in reincarnation, by recounting their details as if he had been
there. A great soldier must become:
. . . so thoroughly conversant with all sorts of military possibilities that
whenever an occasion arises he has at hand without effort on his part a
parallel. . . to attain this end, I think it is necessary for a man to begin to
read military history in its earliest and hence crudest form and to follow
it down in natural sequence permitting his mind to grow with his subject
until he can grasp without effort the most abstruse question of the science
of war.16

Patton was a striking example of strategic intuition by applying
examples from history through coup d’oeil. FM 5-0 seems to quote
Patton for a more general purpose, however, to stress that: “Military
operations are uncertain and unpredictable . . . Any plan is a
framework from which to adapt, not a script to be followed to the
letter.”17 We might add that Patton used strategic intuition to handle
uncertainty and adaptability. We shall see that FM 5-0 handles these
factors in a very different way.
We read on to ﬁnd that Army planning takes three main forms:
Army problem solving, the military decisionmaking process
(MDMP), and troop leading procedures (TLP). In all three forms,
the “planning process structures the thinking of commanders and
staffs while supporting their insight, creativity, and initiative.”18 On
the surface, there is nothing wrong with this statement. But look
deeper, and you ﬁnd the old model of the brain: structured analysis
on one side, and unstructured insight and creativity on the other.
5

Strategic intuition, in contrast, blends analysis, structure, insight,
and creativity so thoroughly that you cannot unravel them. Let’s
keep going to see exactly how.
Army problem solving “provides a standard, systematic
approach to deﬁne and analyze a problem, develop and analyze
possible solutions, choose the best solution, and implement a plan of
action that solves the problem.”19 This four-step sequence is a classic
statement of analytical problem solving. We cannot trace exactly in
history where the sequence came from. It just seems “logical,” so it
is rare for anyone to question it or ask its origin. But we know now
that strategic intuition does not follow this four-step sequence. We
will see exactly why when we work through the details of speciﬁc
planning methods.
Next we learn that “Planning is both science and art.” The
quantiﬁable aspects are the science—“such as movement rates, fuel
consumption, and weapons effects. . . . While not easy, the science of
planning is straightforward.” The art covers dynamic relationships:
“the combination of forces, choice of tactics, and arrangement of
activities, for example . . . The art of planning involves choosing
from interrelated options.”20 Again, we ﬁnd that on the surface this
distinction between science and art makes sense. It allows planning
to embrace both hard facts and creative judgment. But when we look
deeper, we ﬁnd the old two-brain model: one side is scientiﬁc, and
the other side is artistic.
It would be better to say that the quantiﬁable aspects of military
problem solving give us facts, not science. Science itself is an art,
as Thomas Kuhn shows us in The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions.
Scientiﬁc advance happens much more by strategic intuition than
by the four-step logical sequence of Army problem solving. Kuhn
tells us further that science advances by “ﬂashes of intuition” that
re-combine elements in a new way, to give a new solution to a new
problem.21 Kuhn especially notes that a problem and its solution
arise at the same time, much as Gary Klein found that experts only
know what problem they can solve when they see a way to solve it.
As we read on in Chapter 1 of FM 5-0, we soon come to an explicit
divide between analysis and intuition: “When developing plans,
commanders usually choose between analytic or intuitive means of
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decisionmaking.”22 Let’s dive into the details here, to see why this
split between the two methods puts commanders at a disadvantage.
Here we have analysis:23
Analytic decisionmaking approaches a problem systematically. Leaders
analyze a problem, generate several possible solutions, analyze and
compare them to a set of criteria, and select the best solution. The analytic
approach aims to produce the optimal solution to a problem from among
those solutions identiﬁed. This approach is methodical, and it serves
well for decisionmaking in complex or unfamiliar situations by allowing
the breakdown of tasks into recognizable elements. It ensures that the
commander and staff consider, analyze, and evaluate all relevant factors.
It may help inexperienced leaders by giving them a methodology for
their lack of experience.
The analytic approach to decisionmaking serves well when time is
available to analyze all facets affecting the problem and its solution.
However, analytic decisionmaking consumes time and does not work
well in all situations—especially during execution, where circumstances
often require immediate decisions.

And here we have intuition:24
Intuitive decisionmaking is the act of reaching a conclusion that emphasizes
pattern recognition based on knowledge, judgment, experience, education,
intelligence, boldness, perception, and character. This approach focuses
on assessment of the situation vice comparison of multiple options. It
is used when time is short, or speed of decision is important. Intuitive
decisionmaking is faster than analytic decisionmaking in that it involves
making decisions based on assessment of the situation rather than a
comparison of multiple COAs. It relies on the experienced leader’s ability
to recognize the key elements and implications of a particular problem
or situation, reject the impractical, and select an adequate (rather than
optimal) COA.
Intuitive decisionmaking is especially appropriate in time-constrained
conditions. It signiﬁcantly speeds up decisionmaking. Intuitive decisionmaking, however, does not work well when the situation includes
inexperienced leaders, complex or unfamiliar situations, or competing
COAs. Additionally, substituting assessment for detailed analysis means
that some implications may be overlooked. Commanders use intuitive
decisionmaking when time is short and problems straightforward. It is
usually appropriate during execution.

7

These passages on analysis and intuition are out of date. They
reﬂect the state of knowledge about how the mind works that
predates recent research on intelligent memory. That is no surprise:
it takes time for such advances to work their way into everyday
practice. This present analysis aims to help out on exactly that.
When we compare the two passages, we ﬁnd that the statements
on intuition come close to strategic intuition, with these exceptions:
strategic intuition is usually, but not always, faster than analytic
decisionmaking; it is not limited to experienced leaders; it works
well in complex and unfamiliar situations, and with competing
COAs; it does not overlook more implications than analysis does;
and it applies just as well when time is short as when it is not. It is
appropriate during execution, but then so is analysis.
Let’s go through the passage on analysis to see where it goes
astray. First, analysis is no more systematic than strategic intuition:
the systems are simply different. We meet again the four logical
steps of the analytic method: analyze the problem (step 1), generate
several possible solutions (step 2), analyze and compare them to a
set of criteria (step 3), and select the best solution (step 4). Even if we
follow this sequence, we cannot do it without intuition. To analyze a
problem (step 1), we draw on concepts and examples that are familiar
to us—that we have in our brains. We cannot draw on concepts and
examples we do not have.
So why is analysis better suited to an inexperienced leader? You
would think that the more experience you have, the better your
analysis (step 1). Same with generating possible solutions (step 2):
where do these solutions come from? We reach into our brains for
something familiar that suits the situation from our past experience
or learning. Again, experienced commanders have an advantage
here because of their intuition.
Next, when we analyze and compare the solutions to a set of
criteria (step 3), we might ask: where do the criteria come from?
There are countless criteria we could use: what makes us choose
certain ones for this situation? Again, in practice we look for familiar
patterns according to our intuition. And last but not least, when
we select the best solution (step 4), on what basis do we decide? Is
there a numerical score we use to weigh factors? If so, we assign the
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weights by making our best guess—intuition again. If we do not
use numerical weights, we rely directly on intuition to tell us which
solution is best. And how do we assess “relevant factors”? We must
use our intuition about which factors are relevant and which ones
are not. There is no other way to do it.
So even if we use the four-step method of analytic decisionmaking,
we cannot do it without a major dose of intuition. But in reality,
decisionmakers only use this four-step method if they have to—if
ofﬁcial procedures make them do it. When left to their own devices,
they use strategic intuition. And the more complex or unfamiliar a
situation, the more they must do so. Yet there seems to be something
sacred in the world of planning about this four-step method, and
about the second step especially: generate multiple solutions. We
know how Patton handled this step: at the Battle of the Bulge, he
prepared for Eisenhower three variations of a plan his coup d’oeil
showed him. Patton really did not care which one Eisenhower picked.
They were not three different solutions at all: they were one solution,
in three different packages. In any event, it worked. Eisenhower
picked one, and Patton swung into action. Actually, he had already
sent his troops in motion, with orders to follow on which exact way
to turn.25
As Gary Klein shows us, expert decisionmakers do not generate
multiple options. They study a situation (step A), and the problem
and solution come to them at the same time (step B). They think
through the implications to arrive at a course of action (step C),
and then commit to it, or reject it if it they think it will not work
(step D).26 In all four steps, they look for patterns of similarity and
difference with other situations they have lived or learned about.
Every step is fair game for opposing views and full debate, just like
any analytical method. This four-step method of strategic intuition is
what inexperienced leaders need to learn. Making them use the four
steps of analytic decisionmaking only retards their development and
does not help them make better decisions in the ﬁrst place.
Last, but not least, these four steps of strategic intuition are by
nature faster than analysis, but not always. For strategic intuition,
you study the situation until you see the solution and problem it
solves, in one coup d’oeil or a series of them. You cannot force the
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answer. This is why people solve so many problems in the shower,
taking long walks, or at night as they fall asleep. You have to let
your mind make its own connections. If it doesn’t, you take in more
information. Masters of strategic intuition like Patton and Napoleon
took in vast amounts of information all the time. Analysis does not
rely more on data than intuition does: it just handles it differently.
Back to our analysis of FM 5-0. We learn next about “Combining
Analytic and Intuitive Decisionmaking.” We ﬁnd that the “two
approaches are rarely mutually exclusive. Commanders often base an
intuitive decision during execution on the situational understanding
and products generated as part of a preceding” analysis. And “in
a time-constrained environment, many of the techniques, such as
choosing only one COA, depend on intuitive decisions. Even in the
most rigorous analytic decisionmaking, intuitive decisionmaking
helps set boundaries for the analysis and ﬁlls in the gaps that
remain.”27 On the one hand, it is good to read that you can combine
analysis and intuition. On the other hand, it is a mistake to think
that analysis comes ﬁrst and that intuition kicks in only later, during
execution. Another mistake is to rely on intuition only when time is
short, rather than in all situations.
It is good to recognize that intuition accompanies analytic
decisionmaking, but strategic intuition goes farther: it offers an
alternative to, rather than a support for, analytic methods of
decisionmaking. In the end, FM 5-0 advises a commander to choose
between analysis and intuition:
Each method of decisionmaking has its strengths and weaknesses.
Selecting one over the other depends primarily on the experience of
the commander and staff, and how much time and information are
available. The analytic approach is more appropriate when enough time
and information are available to choose among different COAs, or when
the staff is inexperienced. The majority of tactical decisions made during
execution, when time is short and information is lacking or doubtful, are
intuitive.28

Strategic intuition disagrees with this entire passage. There are
not two methods with different characteristics, but one method that
combines analysis and intuition at every step. Analysis is never
perfect, and neither is intuition. They have strengths and weaknesses,
10

but knowing that does not help you choose between them: it helps
you use them both and know their limits. You do not select one over
the other, but apply them at the same time. The balance between
them does not depend on the experience of the planners, nor on how
much time and information are available. No matter who you are, no
matter how much time or information you have, strategic intuition is
the best method.
And whether or not you choose among different COAs does not
depend on the time and information available, but whether or not
you decide to include choosing among COAs as a step. For example,
I could have very little information and very little time, and still
decide to choose among COAs. Imagine that we have stopped for
the night on a convoy, and we awake to gunﬁre at a distance of what
seems a mile away. In two minutes, we can lay our three possible
COAs: offense, defense, retreat. Analytic decisionmaking is quite
possible in this situation, even with very little time and information,
so we can apply analytic methods to tactical execution if we so
choose. Strategic intuition is best not when time and information are
lacking in tactical execution, but in all cases, because it gives better
answers than other methods.
Let’s take an opposite example, where there seems to be a lot
of time and information. We get the assignment to put a land base
somewhere in Region X by 24 months from now. We have plenty of
time and information, so we start our four-step method of analytic
decisionmaking. In the ﬁrst month, we analyze the problem (step 1).
In the second month, we generate possible solutions (step 2). In the
third month, we analyze and compare the possible solutions to a set
of criteria (step 3). In the fourth month, we select the best solution
(step 4). FM 5-0 tells us that an inexperienced commander is able
to follow this analytic method, thanks to the time and information
available.
But was this the right thing to do? Hardly. In month one—day
one, really—we need to ask, “How much time do we really have?”
Region X is not standing still, waiting for us to ﬁnish our analysis.
There might be something we need to do right away. For example,
if we ﬁnd that a close ally is thinking about a base in Country A, we
might need to alert them or at least our superiors to the possibility
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of joint decisionmaking as soon as possible. If we do that, how they
respond will affect what we do next. And so on. At each step, we
marshal as many facts as we can, as quickly as we can, but our COA
starts unfolding, in execution or at least in our minds, very soon after
we start. And we might have little or no information on the most
important piece of the puzzle—for example, the political future of
Country A. We might even conclude we do not need a new base,
but rather access to the ally’s base. So our problem changes, and we
work on how to get that access.
In reality, our method would look more like Gary Klein’s four
steps of how experts think (A-D above) than the analytic methods of
FM 5-0. But as good soldiers, we would write down everything in the
formats FM 5-0 requires, even if it is extra work and does not match
what we actually do. We make sure to follow procedure, at least on
paper. In our minds, though, we are doing something else entirely.
Strategic intuition is how experienced commanders think—and how
we want inexperienced commanders to learn to think—even for
situations that seem to feature plenty of time and information.
Next we ﬁnd the “Fundamentals of Planning.” We read:
Every commander needs a high degree of creativity and clarity of
thought to outwit a willing and able opponent. Commanders and staffs
consider certain planning fundamentals to assist them in developing
effective plans. These fundamentals lend rigor and focus to the purely
creative aspect of planning and provide a crucial link between concept
and application.29

Again, this passage is ﬁne on the surface. Deeper, we see the same
split between analysis and intuition, here called “rigor” versus
“creativity.” Planning fundamentals supply the rigor. But in strategic
intuition, creativity is already rigorous. In the old model of the brain,
creativity was a mysterious force that deﬁed analysis. In the new
model, creativity is connection and combination among existing
elements. That form of creativity supplies its own rigor. It does not
need analytic methods for that.
FM 5-0 seems to treat creativity and intuition as mysteries, as ﬁts
the old model of the brain. That means Army planning concentrates
instead on analytic tools:
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The Army’s doctrinal planning processes (problem solving, MDMP, and
TLP) are based on analytic decisionmaking. They provide a common
way to think about solving problems. When faced with a tactical mission,
Army leaders deﬁne the problem; gather information relevant to it;
develop, analyze, and compare COAs; and select the optimal solution.
The MDMP provides a standard organized framework for commanders
and staffs to approach and solve tactical problems. Using common
processes, understood Army-wide, helps commanders standardize
planning techniques. Standard techniques facilitate effective planning
between echelons and with cross-attached and adjacent units.30

This aim for standard methods makes great sense. It is possible,
though, to integrate strategic intuition into those standard methods.
We no longer have to treat creativity and intuition as mysteries in
our planning. We know now how they work. And this integration of
strategic intuition would leave most of FM 5-0 intact. For example,
the list of 11 Key Planning Concepts would remain the same—such as
Control Measures, Risk Mitigation, and Planning Horizons.31 These
concepts make up most of the planning fundamentals that guide FM
5-0. Strategic intuition does not change them, or at least not much.
Here’s an instance of one such change. In a section called “Effective
Planning,” we read:
Although planning attempts to project the commander’s thoughts
and designs forward in time, it involves an appreciation for planning
horizons. Because the future is always uncertain, plans should not specify
future actions with precision. Rather, they remain ﬂexible and adaptable,
allowing the opportunity to pursue a variety of options.32

On the one hand, this passage is good advice. On the other, it misses
a key element of “the commander’s thoughts and designs”—that
is, they come with a time all their own. A commander’s coup d’oeil
projects action into the future, and it is impossible to predict
beforehand how far that is, in what detail. The time horizon and level
of detail should follow what the commander sees. So they differ for
each situation.
The section on “Planning Horizons” gives three levels: shorterrange or low-uncertainty commitment planning with most detail;
medium-range or medium-certainty contingency planning with some
detail; and longer-range uncertain orientation planning with least
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detail.33 This is a ﬁne method. We simply need some modiﬁcation:
a commander’s coup d’oeil might sometimes give most detail for
longer-range and uncertain planning. For example, you might see
that however they get there, including deception and feints, in a
month you see two units joining up at a precise place and taking
precise action. So your plans reﬂect greater detail at the far end than
at the near end. It all depends on what your coup d’oeil shows you.
Army Problem Solving.
The second chapter of FM 5-0, “Army Problem Solving,” begins
by restating the four-step analytic model: “Army problem solving
is a form of decisionmaking. It is a systematic approach to deﬁning
a problem, developing possible solutions to solve the problem,
arriving at the best solution, and implementing it.34 We read that
simple problems do not need lengthy analysis, but “for complicated
problems involving a variety of factors, a systematic problem solving
approach is essential.”35 Strategic intuition agrees—it just uses a
different system. Especially in complex situations, coup d’oeil cuts
through the mass of information to arrive at a COA.
Let’s go to the main problem solving model, which appears as
a diagram with the four analytic steps broken down further into
seven (see Figure 1). From the view of strategic intuition, this model
is wrong on many counts. Most important is the sequence. The
instructions tell us that leaders must “clearly deﬁne the problem
before moving on to other steps of the problem solving process.”36 In
strategic intuition, your idea of what the problem is often changes as
you get deeper into it. Instead of starting by deﬁning the problem,
strategic intuition tells you to study the situation, with an open mind
as to what the problem really is. So your ﬁrst step should be #2:
gather information.
The instructions give us an example of a problem statement that
results from deﬁning the problem: “To determine the best location
for constructing a multipurpose vehicle wash rack facility during this
ﬁscal year.”37 This example seems well suited to the seven steps: we
consider several possible locations, and assess them all on common
criteria, like cost of construction and distance from the vehicles.
This is a simple problem without many factors at play—so it seems
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1 - ID the problem

Who, what, when, where and why?

Facts, assumptions, and interests

2 - Gather information

LINKED
Screening & Evaluation

3 - Develop criteria

4 - Generate possible solutions

Suitable, feasible, acceptable,
distinguishable, and complete

Benchmark (Does the solution achieve
the desired state?)

5 - Analyze possible solutions

6 - Compare possible solutions

7 - Make and implement the decision

Determine the best solution

Decide and act

Figure 1. Seven-Step Problem Solving Model.
like a candidate for intuition, as FM 5-0 presents it. But the reality
is that simple problems like this one are more suited to structured
analysis in these seven steps. Complex problems are not. They call
for strategic intuition instead.
A complex problem would be that we need a multipurpose vehicle
wash rack facility, but it looks like we won’t be able to build one at
all. Step 3 in the diagram is meaningless now: we cannot even begin
to establish criteria for something we have no idea about in the ﬁrst
place. Our true sequence in this case is step 2—gather information—
at the same time that we do step 4—generate possible solutions. But
even in step 4, we are not really generating multiple solutions: we
would be thankful to come up with even a single solution. And the
answer will probably solve a different problem: washing vehicles.
That is, we look for some way to do without a multipurpose vehicle
wash rack and still keep our vehicles clean.
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What really happens is we do a combination of steps 1, 3, and
4, all at once. As we study the situation, a possible COA pops into
our mind suddenly or slowly takes shapes over time—either way, it
is intelligent memory at work. Our brain breaks down the problem
into myriad pieces and searches for parallels for each piece, until
pieces comes together, and we are at last able to see what the puzzle
looks like. Or the pieces do not come together. It is possible that we
do our best and still end up with no way to keep our vehicles clean.
In practice, problems amenable to analysis versus intuition are
the opposite of what FM 5-0 tells us. The seven-step analysis model
works not for complex problems, but for simple ones, where you
know the criteria and you can generate solutions easily—like wash
rack costs and locations. Intuition—or at least, strategic intuition
as we present it here—works best not for simple problems but for
complex ones, where you do not know the criteria beforehand, and
it is hard to generate any possible solution at all.
Gary Klein and his colleagues offer an alternative model of
decisionmaking that reﬂects how experts use their intuition (see
Figure 2).38 This four-step model is very different from the seven-step
problem solving model of FM 5-0. It shows the decision forming in
the ﬁrst step, while FM 5-0 puts the decision in step 7 and combines
it with implementation. Klein’s ﬁrst step combines identifying the
mission and conceptualizing the COA, both at the same time. The
problem and solution arise together. This ﬁts Kuhn’s description of
the scientiﬁc method in action. Klein and Kuhn are very similar in
this regard: they study what professionals actually do, rather than
what they say they do or what their formal methods tell them to do.
We also note that Klein’s model leaves out two key elements
from the seven-step model: criteria and multiple solutions.
Again, Klein’s way is more scientiﬁc, following Kuhn. Scientists
do not establish criteria, generate multiple solutions, and then
pick one that best ﬁts the criteria. Instead, they study the results
of previous experiments—their own and others—and come up
with a single hypothesis to explain something they think the
previous work failed to explain. Then they test that hypothesis. If
the experiment fails, they add those results to the previous ones
they studied, think again, and come up with another hypothesis.
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THE BASIC RECOGNITION PLANNING MODEL

Situational
information
guidance/
Tasking
from HHQ

Identify
Mission
Conceptualize
COA

Test/
Operationalize
COA

Wargame
COA
(for executors
and planners)

Develop
orders

Disseminate
Execute
Improvise

The “decision”
(subject to analysis
and evaluation)

Once the COA satisﬁces in the wargame
and/or analysis, it has become “the plan.”
No need to compare options.

Karol G. Ross, Gary A. Klein, Peter Thunholm, John F. Schmidt, and Holly C. Baxter,
“The Recognition-Primed Decision Model,” Military Review (July-August 2004): 7.

This chart is reprinted with the permission of Military Review, the Professional
Journal of the U.S. Army, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It
was originally published in the July/August 2004 issue of Military Review.

Figure 2.
Yet Klein’s four-part model leaves out a key part of his own
research: “recognition.” He uses the word in the title of the model,
but does not include it in the steps. Elsewhere, Klein has provided
a more elaborate model for expert intuition that does include a
“recognition” step (see Figure 3).39 In Klein’s Recognition-Primed
Decision Model (RPDM), recognition happens in the second step,
where the situation is “perceived as typical.” What the expert sees
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as familiar leads to four by-products, including an “action.” The
expert thinks through the action, and then decides if it will work or
not. A partial yes leads to modiﬁcation and further evaluation. A full
yes leads to implementation. A no leads back to the ﬁrst step or to
another action to think through.

Experience the situation in a changing context

Perceived as typical
[prototype or analog]
Recognition has four byproducts
Expectancies

Relevant cues

Plausible goals

Action 1 . . . n

Evaluate action (n)
[mental simulation]
Modify

YES, BUT Will it work

NO

YES
Implement course of action

The Recognition-Primed Decision Model (RPDM) in Gary Klein, Sources of Power:
How People Make Decisions. (c) 1998 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Pp. 25.
Reproduced with permission of the publisher: MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

Figure 3.
In this form, RPDM does, in fact, apply to simple problems that
result in one action rather than complex problems that result in a
set of actions. That ﬁts FM 5-0’s view that analytic methods apply to
complex problems and intuition applies to simple ones. But we can
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take Klein’s work one step further and apply the lessons of expert
intuition to complex problems, too. In RPDM, you recognize one
“prototype or analog” that leads to one action. That is the simple
case. In complex situations, you recognize more than one element as
familiar, and it leads to a combination of more than one action. We
move from expert intuition for a single action, to strategic intuition
for a COA.
RPDM is complex enough: we refrain here from amending it to
include more familiar elements and actions. If we seek to improve
FM 5-0’s seven-step problem solving model, we need something just
as clear and straightforward. We ﬁnd guidance in that regard from
the business world, where General Electric (GE) developed in the
1990s a problem solving method that follows the steps of strategic
intuition. We call it here the Insight Matrix—GE called it a Quality
Matrix or Trotter Matrix, named after Lloyd Trotter, the GE executive
who pioneered it (see Figure 4).40
INSIGHT MATRIX
Problem (draft)
SOURCES (draft)

Source
1

Source
2

Source
3

Source
4

Source
5

Source
6

Source
7

SOLUTION (draft)
Action 1
Action 2
Action 3
Action 4
Etc.

Robert Slater. Jack Welch and the G.E. Way: Management Insights and Leadership
Secrets of the Legendary CEO. (c) 1999. Reproduced with permission of the publisher:
McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., New York, NY.

Figure 4.
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The Insight Matrix came from GE’s corporate training center at
Crotonville, New York, headed by Steve Kerr, GE’s Chief Learning
Ofﬁcer. Under Jack Welch, GE comprised some 24 major divisions,
with about 300,000 employees. Every year, most of GE’s managers
spent time at Crotonville. They were put on a team that mixed
functions and divisions, and each team was given a real business
problem to work on. Over 2 weeks, each team developed a solution. At
the end, the solutions were presented to a panel of senior executives.
If they approved the solution, it entered GE’s formal planning. So
the Crotonville training program became an incubator for actual
business strategy.
Your Crotonville problem team used the Insight Matrix.
Crotonville instructors did not teach it to you: the matrix was just
part of what everyone knew how to do. So many people passed
through Crotonville, they took the matrix back to their divisions
and used it there, too. So you and your teammates probably already
knew it before you arrived in Crotonville. You get your problem and
draw your matrix.
At the top of the matrix you write your problem—in draft, because
your deﬁnition of what the problem is might change. Then you ask,
“What do we have to do well to solve the problem?” You make a list
in the left-hand column. Again it is in draft, for the list might change.
Then across the other columns, you write in the sources to search, also
in draft. At GE, they had the advantage of so many diverse divisions
that they usually just wrote those in as the sources. But depending
on the problem, you might write in other companies too, or speciﬁc
units within GE divisions. The matrix of solution elements (rows)
and sources to search (columns) produces a matrix of boxes. That is
where you look for the answer.
You ask, “Has anyone else solved any part of this problem
already?” Your team comes from some of those sources, so they
can tell you the story of their divisions. Steve Kerr made sure that
Crotonville compiled and updated their records of best practices over
the years. You call or e-mail to follow-up leads. It is a treasure hunt
where you seek good ideas that already exist, to ﬁnd a combination
that works. As you proceed, you might alter the list of solution
elements, sources, and even the problem statement—the goal—as
many times as you need.
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The whole cycle ends when the team has an insight: when you
ﬁnd the two or three or ten elements that together solve the problem.
That is when you stop. The Insight Matrix turned all of GE into one
big brain where you search all the shelves for examples from history
that ﬁt the current situation. Jack Welch made this corporate treasure
hunt the centerpiece of his leadership. He called it “Plagiarism,”
with a healthy dose of “gut instinct”—and called his autobiography
Straight From the Gut.41 Welch explained: “The operative assumption
is that someone, somewhere, has a better idea, and the operative
compulsion is to ﬁnd out who has that better idea, learn it, and put it
into action—fast.”42
The Insight Matrix offers a worthy alternative to FM 5-0’s sevenstep problem solving method. We can convert the matrix into clear
directives to match the seven-step format (see Figure 5). These
seven steps match the Insight Matrix as much as possible. Note that
objectives only emerge in steps 4 and 5. In most cases, steps 6 and 7
will result in going forward with the COA. But in some cases, they
give junior ofﬁcers the duty to report that they do not see how to
achieve their mission. That gives senior ofﬁcers the choice of revising
the mission or helping the junior ofﬁcers to ﬁnd a solution.
Although this strategic intuition model is most crucial in complex
situations, it can cover simple ones, too. Let’s return to our problem
of siting a vehicle wash rack. This seven-step model tells us to ﬁnd
out how our unit and other units have succeeded before in placing
their racks: perhaps near water, on sloping ground, alongside a
main road, or inside the vehicle park. In FM 5-0’s seven-step model,
we would probably do this step in our heads as part of “generate
possible solutions.” The strategic intuition model makes the sources
of our solution more transparent and thus easier to evaluate. If I
propose something and you ask, “Where did you get that idea?”—in
the strategic intuition model, I cite precedents. In the FM 5-0 model,
I have to run you through my entire analysis.
If I am a very junior ofﬁcer and do not have any experience with
vehicle wash racks, the strategic intuition model pushes me to seek
out the experience of others. The FM 5-0 model does not. If I am a
senior ofﬁcer with a lot of relevant experience, the strategic intuition
model simply makes explicit what I do anyway, as Klein’s research
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1 - Assess the situation

History, current state, future prediction

Which elements has anyone faced before?

2 - Identify precedents

LINKED
What previous actions have worked before?

3 - Identify previous actions

Course of action that achieves feasible
and worthy objectives

4 - Combine previous actions

5 - State feasible and worthy objectives

6 - Compare objectives to mission

7 - Decide and act or seek revised mission

Are these the most ambitious
objectives possible?

Is the mission possible?

Do or ask up

Figure 5. Seven-Step Strategic Intuition Model.
has shown us. If I am a senior ofﬁcer with no relevant experience in
this situation, the strategic intuition model reminds me to do what
the junior ofﬁcer must do: look beyond my own experience.
For a complex problem with no apparent solution, this strategic
intuition model offers a method to search for one. Let’s return to
our complex situation where we need a multipurpose vehicle wash
rack facility but we cannot build one: has anyone else ever faced this
situation, and if so, what did they do? Or maybe we ﬁnd a partial
solution, where other units have worked out tit-for-tat equipment
lending that we might try to apply to wash racks. For both simple
and complex situations, the Army’s huge investments in lessons
learned and rapid communication can make the search for previous
elements far easier than it ever was for GE. And it ﬁts the Army’s
culture—where I am not shy about asking, and you are glad to
answer as best you can. For GE’s culture, it took Welch a decade to
get to that point. The Army is already there.
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The Military Decisionmaking Process.
The third chapter of FM 5-0, “The Military Decisionmaking
Process,” begins with another quote from Patton: “A good plan
violently executed NOW is better than a perfect plan next week.”
Let’s pause to understand this quote. Patton was impatient with
elaborate planning before his coup d’oeil, but was a master of planning
after it.43 He seems a prime example of Klein’s experts who think
through a good-enough solution and act, rather than taking more
time to generate several solutions and analyze each one to ﬁnd the
optimal COA. But FM 5-0 seems to quote Patton here for a different
reason: to introduce “ways to shorten the process when planning in
time-constrained environment.”44 Let’s study the longer and shorter
versions of the MDMP to see how to integrate strategic intuition in
both.
Right away we learn that the MDMP “is an established and
proven analytical planning process.”45 But is it? We know that it is
established, but have there been scientiﬁc experiments to prove it
works, especially versus other methods? FM 5-0 cites no proof. And
Kuhn tells us that even scientists do not really “prove” anything:
they present evidence to support a hypothesis. The scientiﬁc
community—not the experimenter—decides whether the evidence
is strong enough to declare the hypothesis “true for now”—that
is, until some future evidence modiﬁes or overturns it. Only pure
mathematics has “proofs”—which are abstract logic models rather
than descriptions of anything real.46
We do not fault MDMP for lacking real proof. So far no one has
ﬁgured out how to test one decisionmaking method versus another
in real-life situations—simply because, by deﬁnition, every real
situation is different. You cannot perform a controlled experiment
in real life. We simply note here that MDMP is an established
method, not a proven one in any scientiﬁc sense. In a practical sense,
MDMP has stood the test of time. Enough Army leaders ﬁnd MDMP
sufﬁciently useful to keep it a core method. But the Army should
be open to—and actively seek out—other methods that might work
better. Science marches on, and so should the Army’s methods, if
indeed something better arises. This monograph offers strategic
intuition as one such alternative for the Army to consider.
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We read on to ﬁnd that MDMP “is a planning model that establishes
procedures for analyzing a mission, developing, analyzing, and
comparing courses of action against criteria of success and each other,
selecting the optimum COA, and producing a plan or order.”47 The
basic MDMP has seven steps that differ somewhat from the Army
planning model (see Figure 6).

Step 1:
Receipt of Mission
Step 2:
Mission Analysis
Step 3:
COA Development
Step 4: COA
Analysis (War Game)
Step 5:
COA Comparison
Step 6:
COA Approval
Step 7:
Orders Production
Preparation
Execution

Figure 6. The Military Decisionmaking Process.
The full MDMP diagram in FM 5-0 shows inputs and outputs at
each step, for a total of 21:48
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Mission from higher HQ

IPB products

Decision support templates

Commander’s guidance

ISR plan

COA statements and sketches

Higher HQ’s order/plan

Enemy COAs

Mission to subordinate units

Commander’s intent

CCIR

Criteria for comparison

Preliminary movement

WARNO

High pay-off target list

OPLAN/OPORD

Staff estimates

Task organization

War-Game results

Decision matrix

Higher HQ’s IPB

Most of these items appear more than once, as drafts that different
steps reﬁne. These inputs and outputs are part of the glue that holds
the Army together as it coordinates action of myriad kinds. All
are documents, with one exception: preliminary movement. That
appears as an output of step 2, Mission Analysis. The instructions
that accompany the diagram say it might also be an output of step 1.
In either case, the movement seems to have two possible sources: a
direct command from HQ, or the commander’s strategic intuition.
Also in step 1, the commander does a timeline to determine
whether to use the full MDMP or a shorter one. Let’s jump ahead to
the end of Chapter 3 for a look at what that shorter MDMP looks like.
We ﬁnd that the greatest time saver at every step is “to increase the
commander’s involvement,”49 and so breeze through some of the substeps and leave others out entirely. That ﬁts strategic intuition, as the
commander typically has the most knowledge and direct experience.
But there is only one full step you can skip completely—step 5, COA
Comparison—and only rarely: “The fastest way to develop a plan is
for the commander to direct development of one COA with branches
against the most likely enemy COA. The technique should be used
only when time is severely limited.”50 Leaving out step 5 makes steps
3 and 4 easier too: you develop and war-game only one COA at a
time.
If you leave out step 5, the MDMP ﬁts Klein’s model of expert
intuition and our newer model of strategic intuition. But strategic
intuition applies to all situations, not just urgent ones. And it can
take as much time as the full MDMP: if you do not see an answer
quickly, you keep going until you do. And even with one COA, your
wargame might result in rejecting it or at least putting it on hold, so
you go back and develop another. That takes time too.
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We can revise the MDMP to take these changes into account (see
Figure 7). We would then modify the inputs and outputs as needed
to make explicit the search for precedents and their combination as
the COA develops in the commander’s mind or the minds of the
planning team. Two items disappear entirely: criteria for comparison,
and the decision matrix.

Step 1:
Receipt of Mission
Step 2:
Mission Analysis
Step 3:
COA Development
Step 4: COA
Analysis (War Game)
Step 5: Go back to
Step 2 or 3 as needed
Step 6:
COA Approval
Step 7:
Orders Production
Preparation
Execution

Figure 7. MDMP with Strategic Intuition.
Even when you end up lukewarm about your ﬁrst COA and
go back and develop another, you judge between them for some
unexpected reason that pre-set criteria or a decision matrix cannot
capture. If you need to explain to others why you picked one COA
over the other, you simply brief or write down the reasons. Even
if you use a decision matrix to decide among COAs, you are really
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using your strategic intuition. A decision matrix for a real-world
situation is never a purely analytic task. Let’s look at a sample from
FM 5-0 (see Figure 8) to understand why.
The notes to the decision matrix call the numbers in it “objective,”
but they are nothing of the sort. Every single number comes from
an educated guess by the commander and staff. And at the end of
the exercise, the decisionmaker still must decide whether to “alter
or delete” the COA with the best numbers. But how? By strategic
intuition.
The criteria in the decision matrix are ﬁne factors to think about,
but the decision matrix itself is not the best way to organize your
thoughts about them. The Insight Matrix gives planners a better
tool, because it identiﬁes the sources of their guesses. In contrast,
the decision matrix gives a false sense of hard data, and so does not
encourage us to think through where our guesses come from. Instead,
it treats our guesses as facts. We spend a lot of energy juggling madeup numbers instead of juggling elements for action to come up with
a series of them, as in the Insight Matrix. And the different COAs on
your decision matrix might all have worthy elements: instead of just
choosing one option or the other, the Insight Matrix helps you think
through ways to combine parts of them in a single COA.
As a result, the Insight Matrix is more scientiﬁc than the decision
matrix. A typical scientiﬁc research paper reviews past achievement
in a ﬁeld, builds on it with a further hypothesis, and tests that
hypothesis in action. Strategic intuition does the same. FM 5-0’s only
claim to science is COA comparison through the decision matrix:
but that is not how science really works. Scientists do not compare
hypotheses to choose the best one: they review past experiments
and their competing theories to choose a single hypothesis to test.
Most scientiﬁc experiments fail, of course: their hypotheses turn out
wrong. Likewise, strategic intuition does not guarantee a correct
COA. But neither does a decision matrix, which merely summarizes
the best guesses by the planners about a list of criteria they guess
to be relevant. The only hard science in the decision matrix is the
simple arithmetic of multiplying the score by the weight. The scores
and weights themselves are not scientiﬁc at all.
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Criteria
(Note 1)
Maneuver
Simplicity
Fires
Intelligence
ADA
Mobility/Survivability
CSS
C2
Residual Risk
IO
Total/Weighted TOTAL

Weight
(Note 2)
3
3
4
1
1
1
1 2
1 1
2
1 2

COA 1
(Note 3)

COA 2
(Note 3)

2
3
2
3
1
3
(2)
(1)
1
(2)

3
1
1
2
3
2
(1)
(2)
2
(1)

(6)
(9)
(8)
(3)
(1)
(3)
1
2
(2)
1

20 (37)

(9)
(3)
(4)
(2)
(3)
(2)
3
3
(4)
3

18 (31)

COA 3
(Note 3)
1 (3)
2 (6)
3 (12)
1 (1)
2 (2)
1 (1)
(3)
(3)
3 (6)
(3)
22 (40)

Notes:
1. Criteria are those assigned in step 5 of COA analysis.
2. The chief of staff/executive ofﬁcer may emphasize one or more criteria by assigning
weights to them based on their relative importance.
3. COAs are those selected for wargaming.
Procedure: The staff assigns numerical values for each criterion after wargaming the
COA. Values reﬂect the relative advantages or disadvantages of each criterion for each
COA action. The lowest number is best. The initially assigned score in each column
is multiplied by the weight, and the product put in parenthesis in the column. When
using weighted value, the lower value assigned indicates the best option. The numbers
are totaled to provide a subjective evaluation of the best COA without weighting one
criterion over another. The scores are then totaled to provide a “best” (lowest number
value) COA based on weights the commander assigns. Although the lowest value
denotes the best solution, the best solution may be more subjective than the objective
numbers indicate. The matrix must be examined for sensitivity. For example, COA 2
is the “best” COA, however, it may not be supportable from a ADA standpoint. The
decisionmaker must either determine if he can acquire additional support of if he must
alter or delete the COA.
Procedure: The staff assigns numerical values for each criterion after wargaming the
COA. Values reﬂect the relative advantages or disadvantages of each criterion for each
COA action. The lowest number is best. The initially assigned score in each column
is multiplied by the weight, and the product put in parenthesis in the column. When
using weighted value, the lower value assigned indicates the best option. The numbers
are totaled to provide a subjective evaluation of the best COA without weighting one
criterion over another. The scores are then totaled to provide a “best” (lowest number
value) COA based on weights the commander assigns. Although the lowest value
denotes the best solution, the best solution may be more subjective than the objective
numbers indicate. The matrix must be examined for sensitivity. For example, COA 2
is the “best” COA, however it may not be supportable from a ADA standpoint. The
decisionmaker must either determine if he can acquire additional support of if he must
alter or delete the COA.

Figure 8. Sample Decision Matrix—Numerical Analysis.
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We do not have space here to assess all the other inputs and
outputs of the MDMP from the view of strategic intuition. Let’s single
out just two more for a closer look: staff estimates and commander’s
intent. The estimates are the principal input that gives a commander
information on the situation. Updates to the estimates record the
outcome of each step of the MDMP. Commander’s intent is one
of the principal outputs of the MDMP: it gives others the essence
for what COA to take. In strategic intuition, coup d’oeil feeds both
staff estimates and commander’s intent. How might we modify the
instructions for both?
Let’s look at the standard format for estimates, and a revision that
takes account of strategic intuition (see Figures 9a and 9b).51 Nothing
changes in the Mission. For Situation and Considerations, we add
two new questions: what elements of this situation have others faced
before, and what has worked best each time? These questions might
ﬁt under Assumptions. For COAs, Analysis, and Comparison, the
estimate needs major amendment. We might replace these sections
with a single COA, a Rationale, and Implications. These are three
outputs of coup d’oeil: a preferred path, an understanding of why
it’s best, and implications for action that give you some preliminary
detail on execution.
Note that the revised estimate format has a strong link between
Situation and Considerations on the one hand, and COA on the other:
2d (1) and 2d (2) match 3b. The FM 5-0 format has no such link. The
revised format shows clearly where the COA came from. Where does
it come from in FM 5-0? Under COA Development, we ﬁnd a chart
that puts “generate options” in a series of steps (see Figure 10).52 The
instructions to the chart tell us the options themselves arise in this way:
Brainstorming is the preferred technique for generating options. It
requires time, imagination, and creativity, but it produces the widest
range of options.The staff remains unbiased and open-minded in
evaluating proposed options. Staff members quickly identify COAs that
are not feasible due to factors in their functional areas. They also quickly
decide if a COA can be modiﬁed to accomplish the requirement or should
be eliminated immediately. Staff members who identify information that
might affect other functional areas share it immediately. This eliminates
wasted time and effort.53
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FM 5-0, Figure E-1.
Generic Staff Estimate Format

Generic Staff Estimate Format
with Strategic Intuition

1. MISSION. Show the restated mission
resulting from mission analysis.
2. SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS.
a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations
(1) Weather. State how the military
aspects of weather affect the staff section’s
functional area.
(2) Terrain. State how aspects of the terrain
affect the staff section’s functional area.
(3) Civil Considerations. State how political,
economical, sociological, and psychological
factors and infrastructure affect the staff
section’s functional area.
(4) Other Pertinent Facts. State any other
pertinent facts and how they affect the staff
section’s functional area.
b. Enemy Forces. Discuss enemy dispositions, composition, strength, capabilities,
and COAs as they affect the staff section’s
functional area.
c. Friendly Forces.
(1) List the current status of resources
within the staff section’s functional area.
(2) List the current status of other resources
that affect the staff section’s functional area.
(3) Compare requirements with capabilities
and recommended solutions for discrepancies.
d. Assumptions. List any assumptions that
affect the staff section’s functional area.

1. MISSION. Show the restated mission
resulting from mission analysis.
2. SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS.
a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations
(1) Weather. State how the military
aspects of weather affect the staff.

3. COAs
a. List the friendly COAs that were
wargamed.
b. List evaluation criteria identiﬁed during
COA analysis. All staff sections use the same
evaluation criteria.
4. ANALYSIS. Analyze each COA using the
evaluation criteria identiﬁed during COA analysis.
5. COMPARISON. Compare COAs. Rank order
COAs for each key consideration. A decision
matrix usually supports comparison.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
a. Recommend the most supportable COA
from the speciﬁc staff perspective.
b. List issues, deﬁciencies, and risks with
recommendations to reduce their impacts.

(2) Terrain. State how aspects of the terrain
affect the staff section’s functional area.
(3) Civil Considerations. State how political,
economical, sociological, and psychological
factors and infrastructure affect the staff
section’s functional area.
(4) Other Pertinent Facts. State any other
pertinent facts and how they affect the staff
section’s functional area.
b. Enemy Forces. Discuss enemy dispositions, composition, strength, capabilities,
and COAs as they affect the staff section’s
functional area.
c. Friendly Forces.
(1) List the current status of resources
within the staff section’s functional area.
(2) List the current status of other resources
that affect the staff section’s functional area.
(3) Compare requirements with capabilities
and recommended solutions for discrepancies.
d. Assumptions.
(1) List what elements of this situation others
have faced before.
(2) List what has worked best for each element.
(3) List any other assumptions that affect
the staff section’s functional area.
3. COA
a. List the friendly COA you recommend and
its wargame results.
b. Identify the elements from previous situations in your COA.
4. RATIONALE. Explain why you believe this
COA is the best way to fulﬁll the mission.
5. IMPLICATIONS. List any details of execution
that arose during your COA development or
wargame.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
a. Summarize your COA, rationale, and
implications.
b. List issues, deﬁciencies, and risks with
recommendations to reduce their impacts.

Figure 9a.

Figure 9b.
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Input

Process

• Restated mission
• Cdr’s intent
• Cdr’s planning guidance
• Initial CCIR
• Updated staff estimates
& products
• Enemy COAs
(event templates)

•
•
•
•

Analyze relative combat power
Generate options
Array initial forces
Develop the concept
of operations
• Assign headquarters
• Develop COA statements
and sketches

Output
• Updates staff estimates
& products
• COA statements and
sketches
• Course of action brieﬁng
• Reﬁned Cdr’s guidance

Figure 10. COA Development.
This is an old view of brainstorming that leaves the generation of
options to the mystery of imagination and creativity. The only detail
we get is that staff members quickly reject, modify, or add to the
option—by intuition? There is nothing about how the option itself
appears. Strategic intuition, in contrast, gives a method to how the
option arises that matches how the brain works: new combinations
of past elements. And the Insight Matrix gives us a tool for making
those combinations. It produces one option at a time, though, while
FM 5-0 asks for several.
In any event, we can alter the diagram on COA Development
to account for strategic intuition (see Figure 11). There are only
three differences. First, “Use Insight Matrix” replaces “Generate
options.” Second, we develop one COA statement at a time. Third,
commander’s intent becomes an output of COA development, not an
input: the commander’s intent expresses a coup d’oeil, which includes
the essence of the COA. This view of commander’s intent has some
basis in other parts of FM 5-0. Here is how FM 5-0 deﬁnes it:
Commander’s Intent. A clear, concise statement of what the force
must do and the conditions the force must meet to succeed with
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respect to the enemy, terrain, and the desired end state. . . The
components of the commander’s intent include:
•

End state

•

Key tasks

•

Expanded purpose (if desired).54

Input
• Restated mission
• Cdr’s planning guidance
• Initial CCIR
• Updated staff estimates
& products
• Enemy COAs
(event templates)

Process
•
•
•
•

Analyze relative combat power
Use insight matrix
Array initial forces
Develop the concept
of operations
• Assign headquarters
• Develop COA statements
and sketches

Output
• Updates staff estimates
& products
• COA statements and
sketches
• Course of action brieﬁng
• Cdr’s intent
• Reﬁned Cdr’s guidance

Figure 11. COA Development with Strategic Intuition.
This deﬁnition of commander’s intent seems to include the COA,
not precede it. How else do we interpret “what the force must do”
and “key tasks?” In this way, the commander’s intent is very much a
product of coup d’oeil, where the commander sees what path to take
(COA/key tasks), where that leads (end state), and why (purpose).
You cannot establish the end state ﬁrst, other than repeating your
mission from HQ. For example, if HQ tells you to secure Section G,
your commander’s intent will give more detail than that, as your
coup d’oeil tells you that certain of your units end up in certain places
in Section G. For that you have to have at least an idea of a COA:
which units take which actions. Your COA and end state arise and
develop together, not in sequence.
So commander’s intent should be an output, not an input, for
developing a COA. Brainstorming—or the Insight Matrix—gives us
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both. But FM 5-0 goes on to limit severely what kind of options you
generate for the COA. On the one hand, we brainstorm, but on the
other, we read this:
To develop options, the staff starts with the decisive operation identiﬁed in
the commander’s planning guidance. . . The staff determines the decisive
operation’s purpose (if not stated by the commander) and considers ways
to mass the effects of overwhelming combat power to achieve it.55

So we don’t brainstorm to generate options to meet the mission:
we generate options to mass overwhelming combat power. This
is a very narrow range of options. What about options other than
mass? We have pin and ﬂank, disperse and concentrate, encircle,
breakthrough and pursuit, interior lines, deception, selective shock,
and many others. Mass is not the only answer in combat, as many
great generals of history have shown us. They do more with less,
as our Army will have to do in the future, because of our volunteer
professional corps and multiple wars. And military problems include
noncombat situations where mass is not the answer either, from our
wash rack facility to disaster relief and nation-building.
We understand FM 5-0’s attempt to provide guidance for COA
development beyond brainstorming, creativity and imagination. But
instead of narrowing the options—as mass or any other preference—
strategic intuition offers the widest range of realistic options possible.
To develop a COA, we ask, “What does previous human experience
tell us about situations with similar elements?” This is what goes
through a seasoned commander’s head anyway: strategic intuition
just makes it an explicit part of Army planning.
MDMP gives one ﬁnal source for COA and commander’s intent:
visualization. Here is how FM 5-describes it:
Commander’s visualization is the mental process of achieving a clear
understanding of the force’s current state with relation to the enemy and
the environment (situational understanding), and developing a desired
end state that represents mission accomplishment and the key tasks that
move the force from its current state to the end state (commander’s intent).
Commander’s visualization begins in planning and continues throughout
the operations process until the force accomplishes the mission.56
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Here FM 5-0 tells us that three elements come together in the
commander’s mind: the situation, the COA, and the end state. We
are very close to coup d’oeil. The key difference is sequence: in FM
5-0, the three elements appear in order, while in a coup d’oeil they arise
together. The situation has many sides, angles, and complications:
what matters most comes to the fore only after you see what to do.
For example, rain may cause you to slow down (to let the storm pass)
or speed up (before it’s too muddy), or the rain may factor not at all
in your decision. You only know whether rain matters as part of the
situation when you see what COA to take. Same with the end state:
there are many end states that can fulﬁll the mission. You only know
which one to choose when you see a way to get there.
Still, FM 5-0 elevates commander’s visualization to the highest
plane: it is where the plan really takes shape. Strategic intuition
agrees. It just updates from recent research how the commander’s
brain really visualizes. Intelligent memory works like a movie,
where you literally see what you remember.57 The thoughts that
make up a commander’s visualization come from combinations of
what the commander recalls. Strategic intuition makes explicit the
components of visualization that appear in a commander’s mind.
Troop Leading Procedures (TLP).
The fourth chapter of FM 5-0, “Troop Leading Procedures,” tells
us that TLP extends the MDMP to small units. The steps are a bit
different, because our smaller units must wait for the higher level to
complete its MDMP before issuing ﬁnal orders. The result is Parallel
Planning (see Figure 12).58
For a company or platoon commander, these steps might seem
a bit different from MDMP, but the key elements are the same: to
make a tentative plan, you still go through COA development and
comparison. The real difference is there are extra steps, as you initiate
movement and conduct reconnaissance before completing your plan.
As such, our previous comments on strategic intuition in the MDMP
apply to TLP, too.
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Military Decision
Making Process
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Mission Analysis

COA Development

COA Analysis

COA Comparison

COA Approval
Warning Order
Orders Production
OPLAN or OPORD

Figure 12. Parallel Planning.
We note two further elements of TLP: comﬁrmation brief and
backbrief. In both cases, subordinate ofﬁcers explain what they think
to their superior ofﬁcers. In the conﬁrmation brief, they explain their
understanding of the order they just received. In the backbrief, they
explain the plan they came up with to execute the order. From the
view of strategic intuition, these two briefs are key elements that
hold Army planning together. It is the chance for commanders to
pass up and down to each other what they see—and don’t see—
about their situation and their own COA. Commanders should view
the conﬁrmation briefs and backbriefs of their subordinates as vital
input into their own evolving plans. These briefs deserve a place on
the Parallel Planning diagram, with arrows in both directions (see
Figure 13), in addition to the revision of the battalion procedures for
strategic intuition.
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Figure 13. Parallel Planning with Strategic Intuition.
After all, a coup d’oeil gives you just a sketch of what to do.
You have to ﬁll in many details, and make plenty of mid-course
corrections. Your COA is a puzzle you keep ﬁlling in. Briefs back
and forth help you do that. This is another reason to favor methods
of strategic intuition over formal analytic methods: we acknowledge
coup d’oeil as an educated guess and no more, while analytic methods
give a false impression of certainty, completeness, and rigor. It is
easy to fall into the trap of thinking your decision matrix has real
numbers on it, and yields an answer that is objectively true. Briefs
from your subordinates give you the real-world details of your plan,
in a way that formal analytic methods never can. People make plans.
People turn them into action. Conﬁrmation briefs and backbriefs are
the only occasion where superiors and subordinates get a chance to
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see what is in each other’s brains, and to express what they see in
terms that might not ﬁt on paper or a particular Army format. It’s a
way to visualize to each other.
We suspect that ofﬁcers, in fact, use the conﬁrmation brief and
backbrief in exactly that way. Integrating these steps into the core
TLP—and the MDMP, too—would give the briefs the ofﬁcial attention
they deserve. As with commander’s intent, strategic intuition would
make the brief contain what the brieﬁng ofﬁcers see, in whatever detail
they see it. And that might alter the superior ofﬁcers’ understanding
of the end state and thus the COA, for further backbrief up the chain
of command. Recent experience shows that company and platoon
commanders increasingly face surprising situations, and handle
them in surprising ways. Higher plans need to take account of the
coups d’oeil of ofﬁcers lower down, as the entire operation emerges
from the fog of war.
Case Study: 101st Aviation Brigade.
In 2003, Lieutenant Colonel William Gayler of the 101st Aviation
Brigade developed a revised MDMP to speed up planning. In Iraq, the
101st was able to plan a series of missions, with contingencies, at the
same time that other brigades planned only one mission. Let’s take a
look at what the 101st did in light of our review of strategic intuition
in FM 5-0. An Appendix contains the 101st’s full version.59 Let’s
compare their summary chart (see Figure 14) with the amendments
we suggest in this monograph.
The ﬁrst thing we notice is the format: the 101st did not use any
of the basic charts we ﬁnd in FM 5-0. Instead they worked out what
procedures they needed ﬁrst, and then mapped out what they did.
In this way, their method follows how Klein conducts research, in
writing down faithfully what experts do without a prior model to
go by. We see that the 101st organizes their planning around three
possible Warning Orders (WARNORD), three briefs, and a rehearsal
for the COA itself through the Operations Order. This basic format of
orders, briefs, and rehearsal emphasizes action above all else, again
as Klein and strategic intuition would lead us to expect.

37

1

Hours:
12 hr.
24 hr.
36 hr.

Commander ’s Guldance

Receive
Mission

LZ/OBJ
Sketch

A2C2
Plan

AMPS
Load

MSN
Analysis
Cutsheet

Begin
Base
Order

War
Game

Synch
Matrix

COA
Sketch &
Statements

Collection
Plan

MSN
Analysis
Brief

COA
Brief

1
2
3

2

Exec
Matrix

Rehearse
OPORD

Brief
OPORD

DSM

Graphics
IPB
Process

= WARNORD

Annexes
Complete

Rehearse
IAW BN
Timelines

3

4
8
12

6
12
24

8
16
28

10.5
22.5
34.5

12
24
36

Figure 14. 101st AVN BDE Abbreviated MDMP.
We note next there is only one COA. The 101st usually skips the
steps of developing multiple COAs and criteria to assess them, and
then comparing COAs. As we know, FM 5-0 allows this shortcut when
there is not enough time for the full MDMP. The 101st’s instructions
offer a somewhat different rationale, which gives us further clues to
their method:
The ultimate goal of the process, of course, is to produce an OPORD that
is thorough and executable while giving subordinate units adequate time
to analyze and produce their own orders. Often the time (critical resource)
allocated to units to perform this full process is limited. Therefore, units
must have established techniques for the production of orders in a timeconstrained environment. Corps and Division plans sections are robust
enough to take advantage of the full process, in most cases. At brigade and
below, however, units must understand the full process, but abbreviate,
where able, to meet the goal of orders production. Units can then spend
time on the rehearsal of the operation that is critical to mission success.60
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On the one hand, the 101st tells us they do their version because
time is shorter at the brigade level and lower than for corps and
division. They note further that brigade and lower simply do not
have enough staff to do the full MDMP in a timely manner. Yet
the 101st’s shorter method is not simply a shorter MDMP. They
have revised the entire MDMP. With the time they do have, they
trade analysis and COA comparison for briefs and rehearsal. Their
instructions above tell us clearly that “rehearsal of the operation . . .
is critical to mission success.” In a way, the 101st’s rehearsal is a
shortened Insight Matrix. It works through a full series of actions so
that everyone has a picture of the whole operation unfolding. The
Insight Matrix also works out a full list of actions, but the 101st skips
the step of identifying the source of each one. When time is short or
staff are few, this abbreviation makes great sense.
As a result, the 101st gives us not a reduced MDMP when time is
short for brigade and lower, but an alternative MDMP for all levels,
at all times. If we have enough time and staff, we can add the Insight
Matrix early on, as a worksheet that carries through to rehearsal. The
101st does not make this grand claim for its method—as a possible
replacement for the MDMP. They are simply reporting what they
do. Yet the rationale they offer for themselves can apply to higher
levels as well as lower.
Note their timeline: it tells you how long each step takes when
you have 12, 24, or 36 hours for the entire method. We can easily
adapt the same timeline for 48 hours, or a week, a month, or more.
If all levels adopted the same method, they would all have time for
rehearsals and brieﬁngs that culminate in ﬁnal orders. This kind of
back-and-forth produces much greater alignment for a single COA,
and so aids execution. Even a full staff at corps and division is better
off ﬂeshing out a single COA in rehearsal, and updating it from
briefs by lower levels, than comparing COAs that they only end up
discarding.
The 101st has developed a method that seems to ﬁt well Patton’s
advice for a good plan now versus a perfect plan next week. Their
method applied at all levels offers a way for all commanders to use
their strategic intuition to full advantage, with maximum harmony
among their different COAs. The 101st’s MDMP totals eight pages of
formats and instructions, and at each step emphasizes what actions
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the commander “sees.” As such, it stands out as a strong alternative
to our amendments to FM 5-0 that preserve the structure of the
MDMP and integrate strategic intuition at every step.
Perhaps that is right: not just for brigade and lower, but all the
way up the chain of command. The Insight Matrix offers a way for
commanders or staff teams to give supporting evidence for their
COA, without comparing it to alternatives. The 101st gives support
for its COA in a very different way: with detail on how to carry it
out, worked through in a rehearsal. If your superior asks, “Why this
COA?” FM 5-0 replies, “Because it is the best one we analyzed.”
Our amended version with strategic intuition replies, “Because its
elements worked before.” The 101st replies, “Because we see how to
do it.” The 101st might very well have the best answer. It puts the most
trust in the strategic intuition of the Army’s own commanders.
Conclusion.
This study reviews the Army’s planning procedures to see where
strategic intuition might and should come in. It offers these particular
suggestions for revision:
• the Insight Matrix (Figure 4) instead of the decision matrix in
the MDMP;
• a revised Seven Step Problem Solving Model (Figure 5);
• a revised MDMP (Figure 7);
• a revised Generic Staff Estimate Format for use in the MDMP
(Figure 9b);
• a revised COA Development as a step of the MDMP (Figure
11); and,
• a revised Parallel Planning in TLP (Figure 12).
A more extreme alternative comes from the 101st Aviation Brigade
in Iraq (Figure 14), which reduces the MDMP to eight pages that
all levels—not just brigade and lower—would do well to consider.
Perhaps other units have experimented with amended planning
methods in action, and it would be worth further inquiry to gather
and assess them all.
If the Army would like to try out any of the revisions cited in this
monograph, the U.S. Army War College might be a place to start,
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as a parallel to GE’s Crotonville Institute. Ofﬁcers come through
the College with real assignments behind and before them, and the
Army might have other assignments for them during their time at
the College. That makes for plenty of real problems to work on, in a
learning environment where College faculty can run and assess the
trials.
Beyond these particular revisions to FM 5-0, strategic intuition
offers an overall shift from “planning and orders production” to
“strategizing and communicating.” In current Army methods, there
is no step, no process, no procedure to “strategize”—which is how
human beings really solve problems and make decisions of all kinds.
When you strategize, you let your mind wander among possible end
states, actions, timelines, and particular details of the situation you
face. Different pieces emerge, in different combinations, as your brain
pieces together the whole picture. The revised procedures suggested
here slow down the normal process of the mind to a more deliberate
pace, with more explicit steps, so everyone is more aware of what
they are doing and so that teams can know what is in the minds of
their members.
Orders production becomes a matter of communicating the
picture you see, in whatever detail you see it. Whoever receives the
orders ﬁlls in the blanks with what they see, and communicates it
back to help their commanders ﬁll in more of the picture and keep
up with changes as the operation unfolds. In this way, strategic
intuition is not just faster than current methods: it is less bureaucratic,
too. That is, the steps of strategic intuition follow naturally how
good commanders strategize and communicate. Formal procedures
become aids to thinking rather than hoops to jump through for their
own sake. And strategic intuition is closer to the scientiﬁc method
than current procedures, so above all it gives the best answer.
We end with a warning: strategic intuition poorly done results in
the worst kind of lazy thinking. The easiest kind of planning is: “This
resembles that, so let’s do the same thing again.” That is wrong. Done
well, strategic intuition results in a unique solution every time. No
situation is ever the same as a previous one, so no solution is ever
the same either. Strategic intuition uses elements from the past, but
always in a new combination. The future comes out of the past: it
does not mirror it. The discipline of strategic intuition gives us this
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kind of planning instead: “This part resembles X, that part resembles
Y, that other part resembles D, and we know that other thing is not
Z, but what the heck is it?”
If you cannot ﬁnd a precedent for some element of the situation,
then for that you have to guess. That is true of both strategic intuition
and analytic methods. There is no other way for the mind to handle
a truly novel element. But true novelty is extremely rare in human
history. Innovation happens through creative combination. The
attacks of 9/11, for example, came as a surprise only to nonexperts.
The more you knew about the terrorists beforehand, the more you
expected something like 9/11. Those terrorists used past elements in
a new combination, just as the enemy does in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
wherever else we ﬁght next. To defeat them, we need our ofﬁcers
to be up-to-the-minute experts in war, “conversant with all sorts of
military possibilities,” as Patton told us. Boots on the ground, yes,
but also brains on the ground. And brains solve problems by coup
d’oeil.
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APPENDIX
101st AVIATION BRIGADE ABBREVIATED MDMP
General. The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) outlined
in FM 101-5 is an excellent process to thoroughly ﬂush out an
Operations Order (OPORD) or Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) for
a given operation/mission. The ultimate goal of the process, of
course, is to produce an OPORD that is thorough and executable
while giving subordinate units adequate time to analyze and
produce their own orders. Often the time (critical resource) allocated
to units to perform this full process is limited. Therefore, units
must have established techniques for the production of orders in a
time-constrained environment. Corps and Division plans sections
are robust enough to take advantage of the full process, in most
cases. At brigade and below, however, units must understand the
full process, but abbreviate where able, to meet the goal of orders
production. Units can then spend valuable time on the rehearsal
of the operation that is critical to mission success. The abbreviated
technique described below is used by the 101st Aviation Brigade to
meet this requirement.
1. Baseline Products to Produce. Units should develop a baseline
of products to develop as part of the orders process. Below is an
example of the baseline products given from the 101st AVN BDE
during an OPORD.
• Base Order (OPORD/FRAGO)
• Graphics
• Execution Matrix (or Synch Matrix)
• Concept Sketch
• Intel Annex
• Fire Support Annex
• Service Support Annex
• A2C2 Annex
• Decision Support Graphic (Matrix) Abbreviated MDMP Table
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Plan

Figure A1. Abbreviated MDMP Table.
The ﬁgure above describes the sequence of events in the abbreviated
MDMP. The timeline at the bottom represents the time available to
produce an order and the events that must be completed during the
process. The XO establishes and drives the timeline upon mission
receipt.
2. A Technique for the Abbreviated Process.
A. Receive the Mission/Mission Analysis. During this process,
each section has some speciﬁc duties and products to work. Once
a mission is received (written or verbal), the XO alerts the staff
(WARNORD 1). Immediately, each section begins work in their area.
The most important piece of information to the abbreviated process
is guidance from the commander. Guidance can be given verbally or
with a Commander’ Guidance Worksheet (see Figure A2).
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Commander’s Guidance Worksheet
DTG: _______________
A. Commander’s Intent:
Key Tasks: _________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
Endstate: ___________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
B. Guidance:
Decisive Point: _____________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
Priority of Intel Collection: ___________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
PIR: _______________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
Deception: _________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
Safety: _____________________________________________________
Risk (Areas where it is accepted: ______________________________
____________________________________________________________
(CCIR): ____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
COA(s) to Consider: (Most abbreviated when the commander directs a
speciﬁc COA or some speciﬁc guidance to be addressed in each COA)
____________________________________________________________
Criteria to use (deﬁned): _____________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
Time Plan/Type Order/Type Rehearsal:

Figure A2.
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• The S3 begins to develop a sense of timing actions and events
by transferring tasks from higher’s order to a Synch Matrix
(see Figure A3). This is a useful tool to “see” the relationship
of events-to-time during the operation. In doing this, the S3
is simultaneously conducting his/her own mission analysis.
The synch matrix helps the S3 plan for which elements must
begin movement in order to support a directed task, i.e., FARP
movement, CL III/V resupply, reconnaissance movement, etc.
Additionally, the S3 can see all assets available for an operation
that expedites the development of courses of action.
Time

SYNCH MATRIX

Enemy Action
Decision Points
M
A
N
E
U
V
E
R

Air Defense
Fire Support
Engineer
INTEL
MAN
ARM
C FIX
S FUEL
S MOVE
SUSTAIN
C2

Figure A3.
• The PLEX planners begin their mission analysis and start the
products for the brief to the commander. Depending upon
time available, the planners may use the Mission-Analysis
Cut Sheet (see Figure A4) which has the entire brieﬁng on one
sheet of paper or put the information into a formal brieﬁng
format to present to the commander. Use the cut sheet when
the commander desires a simple desk-side brieﬁng.
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Mission Analysis Cut Sheet
Mission Analysis Cut Sheet
Mission/OPORD
FACTS

Tasks

ASSETS

SPECIFIED

1-101st (24 x AH-64D)

CCIR
PIR

2-101st (24 x AH-64D)
3-101st (24 x AH-64A)
2/17 CAV (24 x OH58KW)
6-101st (24 x UH-60)

IMPLIED

CONSTRAINTS

ASSUMPTIONS

ESSENTIAL

EEFI
FFIR

OTHER INSTRUCTIONS: (TENTATIVE DPS)
RESTATED MISSION:

RECOMMENDED TIMELINE:

Figure A4.
• The S2 begins the IPB or continues the IPB (should be
continuous). The S2 works closely with the S3 and TACOPS
section to develop what the enemy looks like in the form of a
Situational Template (SITEMP). Deﬁne the enemy in terms of
location, disposition, composition, capabilities, and tactics.
The S2 begins the formation of the collection plan to either task
or request coverage from higher (in most cases, the brigade
requests coverage. Aviation brigades do not have assets to
dedicate to collection).
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• The TACOPS section begins the development of LZ or OBJ
sketches (Falcon View photo with graphics). Once developed,
the TACOPS section reviews the ATO and SPINS for mission
data (routes, A2C2 data).
• The S4 and S1 continue their staff estimates and provide
input to the Mission Analysis Brieﬁng in the form of facts,
assumptions, and constraints.
• SIGO continues staff estimates to determine assets available
and options to support developed courses of action.
• FSO continues staff estimate to determine assets available and
options to support developed courses of action.
• **Results of Mission Analysis are produced as WARNORD 2
to subordinate units.
B. COA Development/Analysis/Decision. Often the Commander will direct one or two speciﬁc courses of action (COA) in
the abbreviated process. This Commander’s Guidance is critical to
making the best use of time.
• The S3 and PLEX draft out COAs to reﬁne using a COA
Worksheet (see Figure A5). Key differences in a COA in
aviation units are: continuous, phased, or max destruction;
size of reserve force; location of the FARP; use of USAF or
Joint assets; planned artillery usage; and task organization.
PLEX will sketch out the COA as the S3 assigns Task and
Purpose to each element; then draft a COA Statement. When
developing the COA, use the technique of Vision . . . What
does the enemy look like (SITEMP)? What do we want him
to look like? How do we make him look that way (assets
available)?
• The S2 will develop, with the S3, the collection plan to support
each COA. To accomplish this, the S2 develops a series of
NAIs, TAIs, and DPs to support the escalation of Readiness
Conditions (REDCON) to meet the desired end-state. Once
developed, these collection requirements are forwarded to
higher headquarters for inclusion in the overall collection
plan. Decision points come in three forms:
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— Triggers. These events on the battleﬁeld cause an immediate
action. They do not require the commander to truly make a
decision; the decision has already been made. Example: 20
armored vehicles pass NAI 402 (DP 1) moving South into
EA SMASH [launch lead attack battalion along ROUTE
ORION to EA SMASH].
— Friendly Success. These events are planned as sequels.
What options do we have available if the ﬁrst contact is
successful and there is an opportunity to exploit more
success? Example: initial attack destroys all ADA in EA
SMASH and the enemy is pulling out in a mass retrograde.
Decision to launch additional assets into objective area to
exploit. Should be in the form of a “be prepared task” to a
subordinate unit.
— Friendly Failure. These events are planned as branches.
What options exist to reinforce a unit to cause a successful
outcome? Example: lead element unsuccessful in the
destruction of the ADA in EA SMASH. Launch second
element to ensure the destruction. Again, should be in the
form of a “be prepared task.”
• The FSO and TACOPS sections reﬁne the A2C2 and SEAD
planning to support each COA.
• The SIGO coordinates C2 options for each COA.
• S4 and S1 continue to reﬁne their staff estimates.
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COA WORKSHEET
Mission:

Intent:

Statement:

Unit:

Unit:

Unit:

Unit:

Unit:

Unit:

Task:

Task:

Task:

Task:

Task:

Task:

Purpose:

Purpose:

Purpose:

Purpose:

Purpose:

Purpose:

Task
Organization:

Fighter Management:
Technique:

Figure A5.
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Employment
Cont./ Phase / Max

• The staff then wargames each speciﬁc COA to determine
which is best suited for the mission. Decision criteria will be
developed for each mission separately. If time is critical, use
a Wargame Worksheet (see Figure A6) and save the detailed
war-game until the ﬁnal COA approval by the commander.
Then, synch it out in detail. Avoid getting into the weeds
during the war-game. Limit the war-game to the critical
events identiﬁed in the synch matrix developed in step one.
WARGAME WORKSHEET
Event

Action

Reaction

Counter-action

BPT/Coord Instr.

DPs

1
2
3
4
5
6
1. Critical events are taken from the synch matrix. Only use 2-3 events, unless you are given a
directed COA.
2. Wargame worksheet aids in the development of CCIR.

Figure A6.
• The true value of the war-game is to determine any “Be
Prepared Tasks,” “Coordinating Instructions,” or “Decision
Points” for the operation. These will become apparent during
the Action, Reaction, and Counteraction approach to the wargame and be captured on a Decision Support Graphic (Matrix)
(see Figure A7).
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DECISION SUPPORT GRAPHIC (MATRIX)
DP

Est.
Time

Event

NAI

CCIR

Action

Figure A7.
• The PLEX planner will simultaneously draft the formal base
order during the COA process. This will expedite the orders
production process.
• Once a COA is approved the staff publishes WARNORD 3 to
subordinate units.
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C. Orders Production. Each staff section has responsibility to
complete their respective sections of the OPORD/FRAGO. Under
the supervision of the XO, the order is ﬁnalized and preparations for
the brieﬁng begin. At a minimum, the following will be set up for the
brieﬁng:
• Map with graphics
• Agenda
• Copies of OPORD with all annexes
• Proxima with computer to run the OPORD slides to aid in the
brieﬁng
• (When possible) Blow up maps/photos of LZ and OBJ areas.
D. Conﬁrmation Briefs and Rehearsals. Immediately following
the OPORD brieﬁng, subordinate commanders will give the
Commander a conﬁrmation brief.
• A conﬁrmation brief is simply an azimuth check to let
the Commander know that each subordinate commander
understands the essential tasks given to them. Subordinate
commanders also can relay their expected combat power
at time of execution, and pass on any issues they may have
with the plan. Upon completion of the conﬁrmation brief,
subordinate units will begin/continue to work on their orders
process.
• A back brief is given to the commander to relay subordinate
units’ concept of the operation and usually is given to the
commander prior to the rehearsal. This allows sufﬁcient
time to adjust any plan prior to rehearsing it. Back brief
format follows the COA Worksheet (Figure A5) format: task
organization, mission, intent, concept of maneuver/support/
C2, ﬁghter management cycle.
• The most important event in the orders process is the
rehearsal. This is where the entire plan can be orchestrated
with the actual elements performing the mission. The goal of
an abbreviated MDMP is to offer as much time as possible for
subordinates to conduct an effective rehearsal. An effective
Rehearsal Agenda (see Figure A8) follows the outline below:
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Roll Call – (BDE CDR, S3, S2, FSO, SIGO, BN CDRs, S3s, FSOs, CO CDRs)
GPS Time Hack
Terrain Model Orientation
Critical Events
Friendly Ops Update
Weather Update
Intel Update
Mission
Intent
Initial Set for Combat
Contingencies
Fires
Critical Events
Rehearsal
Issues
Cdr’s Comments

Figure A8. Rehearsal Agenda.
The Execution Matrix is shown at Figure A9.
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TIME

FSCM CODEWORDS

MANEUVER INTEL

CCIR

EN

CSS

C2

FIRES

A2C2

ADA

H-HOUR
LOCAL
X-FLOT
ENEMY
PIR
DP(s)
JSTARS
UAV
ELINT
HUMINT
Q-36/37
2/17 CAV
1-101
2-101
3-101
6-101
T/O
SP
PP/FLOT
RP
ABF(s)
SET COLD
SET HOT
10 MIN
EGRESS
SP
PP/FLOT
RP
FARP
FSCL
CFL
NFA
ADA
INGRESS
EGRESS
ROZ
FS EVENT
EA-6B
F-16 C/J
CAS
AI
ATACMS
TAC
TOC
C2 ACFT
ABCCC
DPP/EAE
DART
FARP
FARP

Figure A9. Executive Matrix.
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